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DISBELIEVING THE CULTURE WARS

Dennis E. Owen'

After Jerry Falwell disbanded the Moral Majority, Jim Bakker was sent
off to prison, Jimmy Swaggart was found to harbor a fondness for the sins
he condemned, and before the Pat Robertson presidential campaign attracted
few votes, commentators were eager to put the most recent round of religiously-inspired conflict in the United States mercifully behind them. One
book even bore the title The Rise and Fall of the Christian Right.' As we

are carried toward the end of this millennium, we find that religious conflicts
in the United States are anything but behind us.
Communities around the nation continue to battle about religious values
and biases in school textbooks. Religious activists have passed anti-gay-rights
ordinances. The United States Congress has passed legislation to prevent
religious activists from blocking access to abortion clinics, and states continue to pass laws restricting access to abortions.2 While school prayer legislation gathered considerable support in the Florida legislature, elsewhere a
principal was suspended for allowing school prayer in defiance of the Supreme Court.3 The Lake County Florida School Board, led by conservative
Christians, voted to require teaching that American culture is superior to
others." Conservative Christian activists have begun fund raising to support
an Arkansas woman who has filed suit against President Clinton alleging
sexual' harassment.5 National Public Radio has just finished broadcasting a
series which borrowed its title from sociologist James Davison Hunter-the
"Culture Wars." Clearly obituaries of conflict and conservative Christian
groups were considerably premature.
Behind all of this activity is a common grievance. The United States has
* Assistant Professor of Religion, University of Florida; Ph.D., Princeton University (1974); M.A.,
Princeton University (1970); B.A., University of Rochester (1966).
1. STEVEN BRUCE, THE RISE AND FAL.L OF THE CHRISTIAN RIGHT (1988).

2. Compare Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances Act, Pub. L. No. 103-259, 108 Stat 694 (1994)
(to be codified at 18 U.S.C. § 248) (prohibiting the use of force or threat of force to intimidate or injure
someone who is seeking to obtain or provide reproductive health services) with ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 720,
para. 520/4 (1993) (requiring that parents receive 24 hours actual notice before an abortion is performed
on a minor); IND. CODE ANN. § 16-34-2-4 (Supp. 1994) (requiring written consent of the parent or guardian before an abortion is performed on a minor); and 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3209 (Supp. 1994) (preventing physicians, except under certain conditions, from performing an abortion on patients who have not
notified their spouse of the pending operation).
3. William Booth, Bring Back School Prayer? That's Rallying Cry in Mississippi, WASH. POST, Dec.
20, 1993, at Al.
4. Rick Badie, Teaching that American Culture Is Superior: A Florida School District Policy Has
Caused a Stir, PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER, May 13, 1994, at A2.
5. Michael Isikoff, Christian Coalition Forms Legal Expenses Fund for Clinton Accuser, WASH.
POST, May 13, 1994, at Al l.
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not only turned away from the "traditional" values which have guided the
nation, but those in positions of power and responsibility have become actively hostile toward the older value systems and the Protestant Christian
tradition from which they were derived. One of the more laudable attempts
to offer an analysis appears in Stephen L. Carter's, The Culture of Disbelief6
Carter describes American attitudes toward religion, agreeing with the Christian Right's complaint that it is systematically excluded from public debate.
However, Carter also takes issue with the particulars of the Christian Right's
agenda. According to Carter, American society excludes religion and religiously inspired language from public discussion. It treats religion as a kind
of irrational social force that is slightly dangerous and should be safely hidden away in the private realm.7
One of the strengths of Carter's approach is his attempt to recast current
conflicts in ways that no longer isolate the Christian Right from everyone
else. He views all religious Americans as being ruled out of order by the
dominant liberal culture. Carter expresses a special concern for minority
religions which he finds to be particularly vulnerable in a society which,
while not taking any religion seriously, tends to act against those which are
in some way unusual, unpopular, or non-traditional. 8
Carter hopes to resolve the conflict by interpreting the First Amendment
fairly strictly, reading the non-Establishment Clause as proscribing any governmental endorsement or practice of religion. The Free Exercise Clause
would then grant far more leeway to engage in unusual and even distasteful
practices than those generally permitted. Although he does not state this
clearly, Carter seems to suggest that more religious groups, especially the
mainline and liberal denominations, should enter public debate as religious
people to divest the Christian Right of exclusive ownership of public religious concerns. The weakness of Carter's proposals lies in his mistaking the
depth and the intransigence of our conflicts with one another. His resolutions
are, at best, first steps, and leave the most difficult questions not just unanswered, but not identified.
Throughout the book, Carter operates on the assumption that American
religions are quite comfortable with the demands of pluralism.9 The criticism
of American culture for requiring religions to divest themselves of their
(often ethnic) particularism-to "desectarianize" as it were-is not new. John
Murray Cuddihy made the case passionately in No Offense. I" Admission into American society required what Cuddihy called a "religion of civility," a

6.
7.
8.
9.
10.

STEPHEN L. CARTER, THE CULTURE OF DISBELIEF (1993).
Id. at 6-7, 16.
Id. at 9.
Id.at 40-41, 90-92.
JOHN M. CUDDIHY,

No

OFFENSE: CIVIL RELIGION AND PROTESTANT TASTE (1978).
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comfortable Protestant public persona which required announcing one's denominational preference with "I happen to be a ... " as if the particularity
of religious identity were a matter of indifference." Carter wrongly assumes
that this "religion of civility" is rather easily attainable by any American denomination; that the generosity of spirit and the inclusiveness which characterized his Episcopal tradition can rather easily characterize any tradition. He
is mistaken in this assumption. Instead, the truth of our current situation is
that the deep religious divisions which currently afflict us pose enormous
difficulties, even for those people of good will who are willing to seek resolution. The ideologies which we inhabit are currently so diametrically opposed, and so incapable of compromise, that our culture wars are likely to
remain with us.
The Culture of Disbelief is a wide-ranging book which includes numerous issues but often hides them away under non-instructive, and sometimes
overly clever chapter and section titles ("Souring on Lemon" for example).
Among the issues Carter discusses are affirmative action, the Christian Right,
prayer in the public schools, abortion, euthanasia, epistemology and science,
unpopular religions, gay rights, tax policy, and political mobilization. Because the central issues which claim Carter's attention involve (1) religious
practices undertaken by governmental agencies and (2) the question of what
kinds of arguments, evidence and languages are to have weight in public
debates, most of my comments focus on the issue of prayer in the public
schools and the teaching of "creationism" as part of the science curriculum
of the public schools. Public schools are governmental agencies, which nevertheless look and feel a lot like voluntary organizations and are charged
with the responsibility of enculturating our children. This makes public
schools a battle ground upon which we confront each other wearing the garb
of our most deeply-held values.
One such battle took place in the Florida legislature over a bill permitting voluntary, non-sectarian prayer at non-required events in our public
schools. 2 As usual, emotions and tempers ran high on both sides. Proponents hoped that they had found the "missing link" between the current,
apparently dismal state of Florida's schools and some brighter and especially
less violent future. Opponents charged that the legislature was about to violate the hallowed principle of separation of church and state. The debate
quickly took on rather strident and momentous tones, as if this issue held the
whole future of the society in the balance. Once again we were reminded of
how strongly we feel about religious issues as they pertain to our public,
common lives and institutions. Once again, we witnessed how poorly we

11. CUDDIHY, supra note 10, at 11-16.
12. See S.B. 1432, 13th Leg., 2d Reg. Sess., 1994 Fla. Laws; H.B. 1679, 13th Leg., 2d Reg. Sess.,
1994 Fla. Laws.
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think about these issues and how abominably we debate them. Although
public debate in the United States has, in general, degenerated to the level of
a commercial, when religion becomes involved the commercials seem to turn
especially angry, misleading and downright mean-spirited.
As someone who participates in the life a Christian community, 3 I
found the quality of this debate especially distressing. One has to wonder
what the significance of allowing prayer at extra curricular events really is.
Could it be that a prayer before a football game actually restores or elevates
religion to that esteemed place in society which the bills supporters claimed?
Hardly. Given the persistent and deep-seated corruption and greed we find
throughout the arenas of American sports, should we not instead advise congregants whose clergy are willing to pray at football games that they might
well consider changing churches to protect the integrity of faith rather than
celebrate a spiritual victory? Unless we are prepared to admit that the tail of
entertainment wags the dog of education (not such a far-fetched idea, actually), relegating prayer to the gridiron, the court, the diamond and so forth
would seem to go a long way toward trivializing religion.
The Florida prayer bill is far more offensive than its sponsors ever imagined it would be. Prayer, in the Christian tradition, is an articulation of one's
most profound desires, hopes, failures, shame, fears, perplexities and gratitude. It is a moment of absolute openness, even nakedness, in a radically
honest relationship with the source of one's existence. It is an ultimate religious act similar to celebrating sacraments. Corporate prayer, in which one
prays with one's religious community, accomplishes for a community what
individual prayer does for a single person. 4 Corporate prayer, then, requires
an intentional spiritual community for its authenticity. It can only legitimately take place in the context of a community specifically gathered for spiritual
purposes, and specifically committed to each other.
Even the best public school would seem to be a very different kind of
institution with a qualitatively different kind of constituency. Rather than a
voluntary organization, the public school is compulsory; one must attend
either the public school or an acceptable alternative. Throughout American
history we have only associated voluntary associations, especially in the area
of religious life, as having any legitimate claim on virtue. Religious affiliation that is not free-that is not an expression of the essential character of a
person, as Jonathan Edwards might have put it--counts as no affiliation at
all. Rather than emerging through free association, a public school is more of
a parish (from which our Puritan forebears fled), serving those of a particular
geographical area with exceptions made for academic interests and capacities

13. 1 am a member of the United Church of Christ.
14. Sometimes the congregation speaks as one, sometimes a designated member speaks for the congregation.
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and most particularly, for racial balance. From the Christian perspective, the
public school has no standing as a spiritual community, and should it attempt
to engage in spiritual practice, its practice is no more valid than would be the
practice of a church that issued drivers' licenses.
Nevertheless, the Florida legislature has tried to pre-empt sectarian conflicts in school events by allowing only "non-sectarian" prayer. So while the
legislature sought to permit religious exercises in public schools, it attempted
to do so in an ecumenical spirit that would be as inclusive as possible. However, good intentions do not necessarily guarantee good law. What the legislature did, in its attempt to be inclusive, was not only provide for the occasion of prayer, but also prescribe the content of the prayer by making it
"non-sectarian." For many religious Americans, the prospect of non-sectarian
prayer, often labeled "generic" prayer, is a guarantee of triviality. The prayer
is so general and unfocused as to be almost without meaning. This may be
the case, but need not be. Obviously it depends on the facility of the person
elected to offer the prayer."
As both a religious person and a student of American religions, I am
baffled by what the legislature hoped to accomplish through the schoolprayer legislation. As hearings were broadcast and interviews with both proponents and opponents filled the airwaves, what emerged was a decidedly
strange view of prayer. There was obviously some linkage in the legislators'
minds between school prayer and at least the violence in the state's schools.
One legislator called the bill the "missing link," although "between what and
what else?" was far from clear. I would infer that "between where we are
now with regard to our efforts to reduce violence and where we would like
to be-namely to have those efforts succeed," would be a reasonable suggestion. One opponent who spoke against the bill was grilled on the level of
violence in his schools forty years ago 6 and the level of violence today in
prayer's absence. The concern of the sponsoring legislator was that the cur-

15. First, in prescribing the content of prayer, the legislature has ventured into a theological realm
where it has neither the competence nor authority to tread. Legislatures ought not be in the business of
making judgments regarding the efficacy of religious practices. When they do venture into this area they,
in Madison's words, "exceed the commission from which they derive their authority, and are Tyrants."
James Madison, Memorial and Remonstrance (1785) in RELIGIOUS FREEDOM 5, 6 (Boston, Lincoln &
Edwards 1819). And for those of us inclined to see a religious victory in the legislature's action, Madison
has equally harsh words. "The People who submit to it are governed by laws made neither by themselves
nor by an authority derived from them, and are slaves." ld. Second, in attempting to be as inclusive as
possible by requiring non-sectarian prayer, the legislature necessarily excludes those for whom non-sectarian prayer is either inefficacious or even worse than no prayer at all. While this may not be in the best
ecumenical spirit, there are some religious people who are thoroughly sectarian in their understanding of
prayer. For them, proper prayer requires specific forms of address, correct body-posture, states of ritual
purity and the like. For some Christians, for example, prayer not offered "in Jesus's name" is not a proper
prayer. For Muslims, the requirement that prayer take place in a state of ritual purity requires the performance of ablutions before prayer can be offered.
16. At that time there was prayer in public schools.
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rent level of violence is much higher and that the reason why is that prayer
is no longer offered.
Carter's criticism of such legislative efforts makes the important point of
addressing the question, "Who can possibly object to efforts to reduce violence in the public schools." Carter's answer is that although the Florida
Legislature's goal is one that all people of good will share, that does not
render school prayer an acceptable means of attaining that goal. 7 Madison
objected to the idea that a Civil Magistrate could "employ Religion as an
engine of Civil policy."'" Thus Carter is a faithful representative of
Madison's wisdom when he notes that "Even were it the case that classroom
prayer would make us more moral, that would not justify the state in what
amounts, for the dissenter, to a coercion of religious belief.. ."" An Episcopalian clergyman with whom I appeared recently to discuss religious issues
in the public schools made the point that from his perspective, for the state,
even through the agency of the local school board, to use religion as an
engine of civil policy was a "prostitution" of religion. Strong words, but not
unreasonable given the propensity of states to seek religious legitimation for
malicious ends as often as for purposes that are noble. Given the rather traditional understandings of prayer operating in American religions, the list of
potential dissenters from state-sponsored devotions is potentially very long indeed.'

17. CARTER, supra note 6, at 187.
18. Madison, supra note 15, at 8.
19. CARTER, supra note 6, at 187.
20. An irony in all of this is that many of the religious groups who support school prayer, even of the
sort we have been discussing, are themselves quite demanding in their requirements for authentic prayer.
Often my students, who are required to visit and observe a variety of religious groups in a course on
American religious diversity, express surprise that at some conservative Protestant churches the "Lord's
Prayer" is not said. The prayer, after all, is used weekly, even daily, by so many Christian churches that
not praying the Lord's Prayer in a service is almost unthinkable. And further, Jesus teaches the prayer to
his disciples in the New Testament. How could Christians possibly not say it? The answer was provided
me many years ago by my grandfather, the Reverend E. E. Owen, who pastored a small Baptist church in
Evansville, Indiana, with a lighted sign over the entrance reading "We Preach Christ Crucified." On the
few occasions when I visited my grandfather's church (I grew up a Lutheran in New York), I noticed the
absence of the Lord's Prayer, and so I asked about it. My grandfather pointed out that when Jesus taught
his disciples to pray, he said essentially "Pray like this," not "Say these words." Thus the Lord's prayer
was kind of a sample, not something to be recited ("by rote") by succeeding generations of Christians.
True prayer, prayer that was pleasing to God, my grandfather explained, could only be spontaneous. It has
to come out of the individual as that person was being guided by the Holy Spirit at that moment.
It may well be a mistake to view the intentions of supporters of school prayer, even religious supporters, as purely, or even essentially religious. Christian Right leaders favor prayer in schools regardless
of the deities to whom that prayer might be addressed. The point is not to provide children with a meaningful religious experience. Instead, the prayer is a symbolic acknowledgment of the principle of authority.
Any prayer to any deity at least makes the correct point that there is authority in the universe which manifests itself at several levels of human experience, including God. However, there is also the authority of
parents, teachers, adults in general, government, and institutions (all derived from God).
For conservative Protestants, the question of the authenticity of prayer comes out much the same
way. Take the often repeated lament that the Supreme Court, by its holding in Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S.
421 (1962) and School Dist. of Abington Township v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963), kicked God out of
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the public schools. A veritable host of commentators from a score of religious traditions have noted the
absurdity of the idea of God being kicked out of anywhere. Surely an omnipotent and omnipresent deity is
more than a match, even for the Supreme Court. Yet these critics also miss the point. For Evangelical and
Fundamentalist Protestants, the way in which one is to think of the relationship between divinity and
human society has been modeled in God's covenant with the Israelites. Hence innumerable Christian Right
publications cite the straightforward covenantal theology of 11 Chronicles 7:14: "if My people who are
called by My name will humble themselves, and pray and seek My face, and turn from their wicked ways,
then I will hear from heaven, and will forgive their sin, and heal their land."
To understand the linking of this individualistic Protestant view of the religious life with the corporate dimensions of the Israelite covenant, it will be helpful to think in terms of a two-fold relationship
with God. As far as salvation is concerned, faith in God's offer of redemption through the death and resurrection of Jesus Christ is one's only access. One's actions ("works") can never be enough to merit
God's forgiveness and the gift of salvation. However, there is also a more limited and temporal aspect of
one's relationship to God in which the relationship of works and blessing is a straightforward quid pro
quo. Here there is the question of temporal success which can be both an individual and corporate matter.
As presented by conservative American Protestants, the nation's corporate relationship with God is still a
covenant, but not one which requires authentic faith in any theologically rigorous way. What is required at
the societal level is a kind of formalism which, at the individual level would be seen as empty. Thus God
is not "worshiped" by school prayer, since "worship" entails authenticity and depth of commitment, but
God is rather "honored" by school prayer. And although individuals are not "saved" by formal acts of
honoring God ("works" in Protestant thought), these formal acts, empty as they may be of saving faith,
still determine the immediate, temporal fate of a society. The point of school prayer is to earn God's limited blessing which is meted out in return for formal recognition.
From a secular constitutional perspective, the problem with government practice of religion is that it
violates some basic principles which inform our national covenant. Writing for the majority Justice Black
held with regard to the establishment clause, "Its first and most immediate purpose rested on the belief
that a union of government and religion tends to destroy government and to degrade religion." Engle v.
Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 431 (1962). By "destroying" government, Justice Black meant something really
closer to corrupting it than actually bringing governments down. In inviting governmental action across an
inviolable boundary, establishments transformed legitimate governments into tyrannies and earned them
the animosity of their own citizens. We need to add to this vision that governmental practice of religion
also violates perhaps the most basic right Madison identifies in his Memorial and Remonstrance. Having
argued that religious freedom and commitment are unalienable rights of individuals and that civil society,
being a creation of free individuals, has no authority over religion, Madison then goes on to argue that
government, being the creation of civil society (and thus twice removed from the grant of an unalienable
right), has even less claim to authority in the spiritual realm. Madison, supra note 15, at 6-7. Should government violate this boundary, the result, as Madison saw it, was as profound a violation of rights as there
could be. Madison argues in the fourth point of the Memorial and Remonstrance:
If "all men are by nature free and independent," all men are to be considered as entering
into society on equal conditions; as relinquishing no more, and therefore retaining no less,
one than another, of their natural rights. Above all are they to be considered as retaining
"equal title to the free exercise of religion according to the dictates of conscience."
Madison, supra note 15, at 7.
To enter into society, as Hannah Arendt understood and so forcefully pointed out, is not simply a
right, but the very foundation of our humanity:
To live an entirely private life means above all to be deprived of things essential to a truly
human life: to be deprived of the reality that comes from being seen and heard by others, to
be deprived of an 'objective' relationship with them that comes from being related to and
separated from them by a common world of things, to be deprived of the possibility of
achieving something more permanent than life itself.
HANNAH ARENDT, THE HUMAN CONDITION (1958). When government practices religion-and there is no
generic religion than can be practiced, no truly non-sectarian prayers that can be spoken-some of the
citizens whose free assent also creates that government are deprived of the possibility of entering the
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A final and deeply troubling concern about school prayer combines
Carter's concern that religions remain viable as "independent power bases
that exist in large part on order to resist the state" and Justice Black's assertion that a "union of government and religion tends.., to degrade religion."2' Societies are invariably prone to seek religious legitimation by disguising the reality of their arbitrary, humanly constructed character and
claiming a more substantial presence and permanence as products, often, of
divine will and approval. Religions in American history have often taken the
bait. Before this came to press, the self-identified "Christian" members of the
Lake County school board decided to require teachers to inform students that
American culture is "superior" to all others.22 Likewise, the Protestant
churches of the South during the Civil War were given the honor of legitimating the institution of slavery. Not only did they do so, arguing that slavery was indeed a divinely authorized form of human governance, but they
did so with a vengeance. Jon Butler documents the chilling story of the established church's development of a doctrine of absolute obedience. Citing
the mid-eighteenth century sermons of Thomas Bacon, Butler writes:
Slaveholders could expect much from slaves because slaveholders
were God agents. Slaves ought to "do all service for them as if
[they] did it for God himself.... Slaves must obey commands
that 'may be [for]ward, peevish, and hard.' " They must even
obey commands that forced them into illegal and immoral acts.
Even to these commands, disobedience constitutes "faults done to
God himself." It was not for slaves to object to these acts. God
would forgive them in the next world; in this world obedience
took precedence over moral courage."
For Protestants to produce such a doctrine is truly staggering, for if there
is a central core to Protestantism it is that no one, nothing, no person or
institution can claim to be an extension of God's sovereignty. Yet according
to the Protestant churches of the South, a slaveowner could act with an authority denied the Pope. And as far as the slave was concerned, there was, at
least in the short run, an authority higher than God. Such has been the effect
of the task of social legitimation upon American religion-a betrayal of its
very core.'
public realm, the source of one's human reality, on an equal footing with all other citizens. Governmental
practice of religion identifies the public realm as belonging uniquely to some and not to others.
21. CARTER, supra note 6, at 35, 134.
22. My guess is that when the dust settles "American culture" will turn out to mean largely white,
Protestant male culture.

23.

JON BUTLER, AWASH IN A SEA OF FArrH

142-43 (1990).

24. This is also the place to make the Niebuhrian point that any society is, at best, immoral, for all
societies are the outcomes of competing self-interests which inevitably must resort to compulsion. This
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A second area of conflict regarding public schools which has long afflicted us, and is likely to continue to be a focus of acrimonious conflict is the
teaching of evolutionary biology and the exclusion of Biblical creation from
the American science curriculum. Carter's treatment of the issue is again
partial and fails to appreciate the full extent of disagreement on the issue as
well as the difficulty we have in laying it to rest. In brief, Carter's account of
the evolution/creation controversy concludes that "creation science" should
not be incorporated into the biology curriculum, not because it is religiously
motivated, but because it is bad science. He faults the courts and the scientific establishment for not limiting their dismissal of creation science to its
failure as science, but instead, broadening the dismissal to impugn the religious motivations of those who advocate creation science. Commenting on
Edwards v. Aguillard,2 Carter writes that "Edwards represents a humiliating
constitutional slap in the faces of millions of Americans who are unwilling to
make the separation of faith and self that secular political and legal culture
often demand."' Carter attempts to assimilate this issue to the larger theme
of the dominant culture's intolerance of serious religious commitment while
at the same time maintaining that those who reject "scientific creationism" as
a viable ingredient in the biology curriculum have it right. It is, at best, an
uncomfortable combination.
Carter's approach to the issue has much to commend. He properly takes
issue with the view "of creationists as backward, irrational, illiberal fanatics,
not too smart and not too deserving of respect."'" But then Carter implies
that "creation science" has been unfairly dismissed-that the comparison of
creationism to Lysencoism is unfair and misleading.' At another point he
suggests, "The demand for the teaching of scientific creationism... is much
like the demand for what is described as a multicultural curriculum....
Many on the left find it easy to embrace the multiculturalist movement but

does not mean that societies are evil, nor that none are better than any others. However, it does mean that
no society can claim a divine imprimatur. To allow government to practice religion, even in the form of
school prayer, begins destroying that critical distance which allows religions to serve as independent centers of power-what sociologists usually call "mediating institutions." Socially, it is the function of these
institutions not just to stand between individuals and the power of the state, but to serve as forums in
which individuals can cooperatively evaluate public questions and bring to bear upon them a rich diversity
of perspectives. Niebuhr also reminds us that society, like religion, is commonly used as a measure of
moral worth. Those of us who sacrifice individual gain for public good, or who even sacrifice our lives
for the survival of the state, are cited and celebrated as examples of moral virtue worthy of imitation.
Given the already existing potent moral authority of both society and state, adding the moral blessing of
religion runs the risk of depriving oneself of any standpoint from which one could take issue with those
currently in power.
25. 428 U.S. 578 (1987).
26. CARTER, supra note 6, at 169.
27. Id. at 159.
28. Id.
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are deeply offended by the creationists... ,"29 Carter's rejection of the
charge of anti-scientific irrationalism on the part of American Fundamentalists is accurate, but seriously understates the esteem in which Fundamentalists hold science. He fails to appreciate both the stark nature of the conflict
between "creation science" and evolutionary biology as well as the rather
surprising epistemology of creationists and Fundamentalists in general. These
two lapses in Carter's analysis are particularly puzzling considering the fact
that he acknowledges that "creation science" attacks most of modern science
(physics, astronomy, genetics), not just evolutionary biology.0
Unfortunately, our discussions of this controversy have been impoverished by the fact that Edwards was narrowly decided compared to McLean v.
Arkansas Board of Education,3 which saw a much more extensive consideration of the complex scientific and religious issues involved.32 Unlike Edwards, McLean included testimony from the nation's leading researchers in a
variety of fields and looked closely at questions of the nature of scientific
study, the status of evolutionary theory in the sciences, the scientific status of
"creation science," and the differences between theology/religion and science
as modes of human knowing.
We should be clear at the outset that the creation/evolution issue is poorly named. It is not the creationist's distinctive position that the development
of life was "directed by God," as Carter suggests.3 The choice is emphatically not between evolution on the one hand, and theism or religion (or creation) on the other although the "creationists" invariably portray it that way.
The methodological non-theism of science does not translate automatically
into the religious position of atheism. Since evolutionary science can deal
only with what are properly called the "proximate origins" of life, the
question of life's ultimate origin is left open. 4 Science does not answer the
question, "Why is there something rather than nothing?" but only informs us
on how that something developed once it already existed. Theistic evolution,
the idea that the evolutionary process was itself created by God, is as old as
any ideas of evolution. Thus it is the claim that evolution did not occur
which is the center of "creation science," not the assertion that there was
(and is) a creator.
While it is widely known that Protestant Fundamentalism's rejection of
evolution results from its commitment to a literal reading of the first chapter

29. Id. at 180.
30. Id. at 161.
31. 529 F. Supp. 1255 (D. Ark. 1982).
32. For a full account of the Arkansas case, see LANGDON GILKEY, CREATIONISM ON TRIAL: EVOLUTION AND GOD AT Ltn.rE ROCK (1985); see also RONALD L. NUMBERS, THE CREATIONISTS: THE EVOLUTION OF SCIENTIFIC CREATIONISM (1992).
33. CARTER, supra note 6, at 157.
34. GILKEY, supra note 32, at 49-52.
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of the book of Genesis, it is less well known that Fundamentalism's commitment to a literal reading of the Biblical text is born of its conviction that
only science provides us with viable knowledge about anything. This assertion seems to have gotten it all wrong, but in fact, Protestant Fundamentalism
can only be understood when one appreciates the extent to which its view of
the world, and how one can know it, is thoroughly dominated by science
even if Fundamentalism fails to understand the nature of modern science
very well.
Fundamentalism is a particular form of conservative Protestantism and
like any conservative form of religion is characterized by a great amount of
supernaturalism.35 For the forms of Evangelicalism we call "Fundamentalist," the Bible is the primary agent of supernaturalism available to Christians.36 Fundamentalism is committed to the idea of Biblical inerrancy.
More than anything else this is its distinguishing feature. In language favored
by Fundamentalists, the Bible is "the verbally inspired, inerrant Word of
God." This claim means that the text of the Bible is wholly and completely
true when the text is read literally, that every word in the text is exactly the
word God wanted there, and that the text is to be read literally whenever
possible. Accordingly, when the Bible makes what appears to be an historical
statement, it is an historical statement, and it is true. Similarly what appear to
be geographical statements are geographical statements, what appear to be
scientific statements are scientific statements and are geographically and
scientifically true.3"
The conflict which Fundamentalism has sought with America's scientific
culture is thus far more intractable than Carter admits. He states that "in
deciding whether scientific creationism is a plausible account of the origin of
the earth and of humanity ... the only evidence that counts is the evidence
of natural science .... The evidence on the basis of which the creationist
might have decided on a world view-Scripture itself-is out of bounds."3
If correct, one must conclude that this resolution of the issue will carry very

35. The supernatural is believed not merely to exist, but to be immediately accessible to human beings
in a variety of ways.
36. As distinct from "speaking in tongues" or divine healing.
37. But why this insistence on reading literally whenever possible? For other Christians, even other
Evangelicals, Genesis is read as a source of insight into spiritual truth-a claim that the universe is dependant on an ultimate source for its existence to be sure, but beyond that, the text offers insight into the
nature of human beings, our place in and responsibilities for the rest of creation, our need for human
community and so forth. All these "truths" are compatible with the scientific "truth" of evolution. Why are
they insufficient for Fundamentalism? The answer, I believe, lies in the fact that Fundamentalism, more
than any other form of American religion, has ceded to science a monopoly on all that is worth knowing.
Where other forms of American religion have challenged science's often arrogant claims to be the only
source of human "knowledge," fundamentalism has chosen to try to recast itself in the image of science.
Ultimately Fundamentalism's desire is to be science because it is convinced that only as science is religion worth one's trust.
38. CARTER, supra note 6, at 223.
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little weight with Fundamentalism, for it merely restates the starting point,
the rejection of Biblical revelation by science's methodological non-theism.
The Fundamentalist argument has been all along that Evolutionary biology is
unscientific, or at least no more scientific than "creation science." What is
ultimately at issue are the very cannons of science. The non-negotiable Fundamentalist claim is that true science must begin with a recognition of the
truth of the Bible and proceed from there. Science too, Fundamentalists argue, begins with assumptions and so there is really no difference between the
two approaches. They are. equally arbitrary.
I am less confident than is Carter regarding the willingness of those who
mentor the "creation science" movement to recognize accepted rules of debate, evidence, and inference. Carter is surely wrong when he asserts that
creationists "understand quite well that the hermeneutic they have chosen has
interpretive consequences, not just for their sacred text, but for the entire
natural world. . . ."' Creationists do not openly confront the extent to
which their views, if legislated into dominance, would undercut modem
science. If anything, they tend to compartmentalize and act as if changes in
one area would have little effect on others. The charge of "Lysenkoism"
bears more merit than Carter admits, for under Lysenco Soviet agricultural
research was required to operate under the revealed Marxist truth that genetics was false and that environment (means of production) was everything.
Under "creation science" physics and astronomy would be required to operate under the revealed truth (from the King James version) that the earth is
ten thousand years old. If there is a distinction here, it is one without difference.

4

0

This brings us to the problem which threads its way through Carter's
entire book although I believe it never receives the full treatment it deserves:

39. ld.at 179.
40. One of the most commonly offered arguments in the creationists' arsenal is the claim that the
second law of thermodynamics (which states that energy tends to be degraded into increasingly diffuse
and less usable forms) renders evolution impossible. Since evolution is a movement from simple to complex, from more diffuse to more concentrated, evolution violates the law that things tend toward entropy
(randomness) and therefore could not have occurred. The ink was barely dry on this argument when it was
devastated by critics who pointed out that all life is anti-entopic, and that if the second law of thermodynamics meant what creationists claimed, life, at least life as we know it, could not exist. Further, it was
pointed out that the second law applies only to closed systems, and since the earth and all its life forms
are open systems (receiving far more energy from the sun than they are able to concentrate through their
processes of growth and evolution), the second law indeed holds for the relevant system, the solar system,
and the organic processes of the earth are not in violation of the second law properly understood. Despite
this devastating criticism, advocates of "creation science" continued to assure congregations, Christian
schools and readers around the United States that the second law of thermodynamics precluded evolution
and made evolutionary biologists unscientific. There seem to be only a limited number of ways to construe this, none of them very flattering. For if rational processes and rules of argument have any claim
upon us, the continued use of the second law argument after such a decisive refutation seems cynical,
deceptive, and perhaps even morally defective. What also seems as elusive as ever is any resolution of the
issue through the processes of rational investigation and debate.
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what "languages" have weight in our public discussions, particularly in discussions which impact our lives through the policies of the welfare state?
Carter's claim throughout all his discussions is that religious Americans have
no voice, as religious people, in public debate. God's will, Carter notes, is
seen neither by the liberal tradition nor the Supreme Court as an adequate
basis upon which issues of public morality can be decided.4 ' Instead, Carter
argues citing Michael Lerner, that liberals and the liberal state have "framed
their intellectual commitments that the only things which really move people
are economic entitlement and political rights."4' More accurately, Carter
argues that "today's political philosophers see public dialogue as essentially
secular, bounded by the requirements of rationality and reason. It is not easy
to fit religion into that universe, which is why some religiously devout people find themselves at war with the dominant trends in contemporary philosophy."'43 On the same page he cites Martha Nussbaum's warning, 'To devalue passion when it misleads would not only be to neglect its actual place in
our lives, but more significantly would transform it into something else,
something akin to reason."
Unless I am misreading him, Carter here seems to be grouping religion
among those powerful but irrational motivating forces which profoundly
affects our common life. He may very well be right, but he can not make
this point and then find contemporary political philosophers wanting because
they call for "dialogue involving 'the exercise of a common critical rationality.' "4 Carter's issue with liberal culture at the outset of the book is that it
dismisses religious commitments as irrational and hence best, indeed necessarily, left out of public debate. But to continue to exclude religion as irrational invites rejection. Carter writes, "unless liberal theory and liberal law
develop ways to welcome the religiously devout into public moral debate
without demanding that they first deny their religious selves, the caricature of
liberalism offered by the radical right will more and more become the
truth.. . ."' So we are left with dire warnings, but little directions for alternate courses of action. We are also left in the dark about Carter's evaluation
of religion. He tells us he is an Episcopalian and his theological opinions
seem to run in the direction of Neo-Orthodoxy. We know he takes religion
seriously as a central piece of both individual and group identity. We also
know he believes religion is singled out for protection by the Free Exercise
Clause of the First Amendment, but we do not know how Carter sees religion entering into public dialogue. Is it an irrational factor or not? If so, is
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there some typology of irrational factors and how they enter public debate
that might guide us?
To return to Carter's criticism of liberal tradition for failing to see that
many Americans are likely to resolve moral debate by appealing to the will
of God, the immediate skeptical response is, of course, "Whose God?" and
"Which expressions of God's will?" If Carter believes that questions regarding the origin of species are to be answered by the scientific method alone,
why should questions of public morality be any different? Unless Carter
believes that the empiricists are right and moral questions inexorably dissolve
into mere statements of preference, why should they not be answered on the
basis of the moral language and commitments common to the whole of the
society? This last dismal, but popular, possibility is even put forward by
numerous Christian Right leaders as a way of claiming authority in the public realm. Since there is neither a possibility of a moral consensus developing
out of any branch of human thought nor any way, ultimately, of condemning
any action as morally wrong, we have only two choices: either acknowledge
the authority of a set of standards not derived from human thought, but delivered instead by divine revelation, or drown in a sea of chaos in which all
individuals are laws unto themselves and no one can be held accountable.
Christian Right leaders have long argued that there can be no compromise between Christianity and other, particularly secular, modes of thought.
Francis Schaeffer puts the issue starkly in his influential Christian Manifesto.47 Schaeffer argues that the world is divisible into two competing and
mutually exclusive world views: Christianity and secularism, or secular humanism. Moreover, these world-views are totalistic, explaining everything
without remainder and leaving no room for alternate explanations. Consequently, Schaeffer writes, 'There is no way to mix these two total world
views. They are separate entities and cannot be synthesized."4' Schaeffer
offers a prescription for an unending culture war in which compromise or
even real dialogue is precluded. His is a "winner take all" proposition.
Carter's failure to confront that totalistic nature of the Fundamentalist challenge to modem society render his hints at resolution naive at best, but only
overly optimistic at worst. In part, this failure seems to proceed naturally
from Carter's genial Episcopalianism, a tradition long comfortable with pluralism and inherently ecumenical in spirit. For example, in commenting on a
negative assessment of God's attention to Jewish prayer made by a president
of the Southern Baptist Convention, Carter acknowledges that for some
Americans, "only Christians-people who profess a faith in Jesus Christ...
can achieve eternal life."'49 But he then offers a dissenting opinion: "My
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Id. at 21.
CARTER, supra note 6, at 90.
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own view is that exclusivity of this kind betrays a lack of faith in God's
charity, but everyone is entitled to choose a religious belief."5 Presumably
one is entitled to choose a religious belief which consigns everyone else to
the fires of hell or even to lower rungs on the evolutionary ladder. Or is one?
According to Carter,
In religiously pluralist America, lots of faiths make exclusivity
claims and, for the most part, although any one of them may be
right, the matter does not excite great public interest. But when
leaders of large and influential Christian denominations make such
claims, danger lurks on the horizon. The lurking danger has...
everything to do with the propensity of religious groups as they
grow powerful to take secular action consistent with their
claims."
The problem I have with this line of thinking is that it will not take us
very far toward resolving America's "culture wars," at least not unless a
significant portion of the population is converted. For American Fundamentalists, Christians do know the mind of God, for it is revealed in the Bible.
Fundamentalist sermons will include assurances such as "God says in the
Book of Proverbs," as a matter of course, and one can often hear the Bible
identified as "the mind of God." In these traditions one would not include a
qualification such as "my reading of Christianity" for to do so would
trivialize what is absolute. To understand Fundamentalism, one must remember that Biblical truth is seen as pellucid, it is clear throughout and immediately available to the comprehension of the human mind. One does not interpret the Bible in Fundamentalism, one believes it. On several occasions I
have heard leading Fundamentalist preachers put it something like this, "It
isn't so much that we need to believe in God, what we need to do is to believe God." Believe God? Exactly-and the way one does that is by acknowledging the truth of the Bible-the very mind of God. So Carter's prescription for opening up the arena of public debate to religious input does
not really open it very wide. The liberals and the neo-orthodox are quite
welcome to share their understandings of what the Christian faith requires,
but Fundamentalists, it seems, who know what God requires, must check
their exclusivity at the door. That means they must stop being Fundamentalists, which is precisely the requirement Carter believes is unfairly imposed
on all religious discourse by the liberal American society.
The Culture of Disbelief winds up in this bind because of Carter's desire
to give religious people access to the world of public discourse as religious
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people, and his realization that the totalistic claims of American Fundamentalists, the driving force behind the conservative side of the "culture wars,"
espouses an ideology which would eliminate the public order (as we have
known it) from the writing of the Constitution onward. Consequently, he
rejects what may well have served him as a gate keeper to public discourse
when he writes:
I think legal theorist Michael Perry has it right when he argues
that forcing religious arguments to be restated in other terms asks
a citizen to "bracket" religious convictions from the rest of her
personality, essentially demanding that she split off a part of herself. Says Perry: "To bracket them would be to bracket-indeed,
to annihilate-herself. And doing that would preclude her-the
particularperson she is-from engaging in moral discourse with
other members of society."52
Leaving aside the fact that we all are required to "bracket" aspects of
ourselves when entering civil society and seldom experience annihilation as a
result, Carter's rejection of the idea that religious people might "translate"
their religious convictions into a common moral language as a way of speaking with weight in public debate is premature. For example, the arguments
that we ought not pass gay rights laws because God disapproves of homosexuality or that we ought to have affirmative action because God requires us to
rectify past injustices probably cannot be weighted heavily in public debate.
People within the same general tradition, and often even within the same
church, will disagree on the content of God's will on questions such as these.
Carter aims well-directed criticism at religious-political activists for assuming
that God approves of their political agenda, and for not considering the likelihood that "the will of God," as Carter puts it, "is not discerned by the faithful, but created by them."53 Letting religious people participate as religious
people in public debate is easy; evaluating what they say is difficult.
The capacity of religiously-based values to be expressed in the common
secular language of the society need not mean the annihilation or even the
diminution of the religious self. That would only be true if one assumed an
infinite gulf or an active hostility, as we saw with Francis Schaeffer, between
the religious and the secular. Those who participated in the writing of the
Constitution, and those who prayed for them from afar saw no such opposition. That Thomas Jefferson took the New Testament, literally removed the
supernaturalism and pasted together the ethical teachings of Jesus, is frequently cited as a sign of Jefferson's respect for Christianity. It is also a sign
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of Jefferson's conviction that whether one started from Biblical revelation or
from a rational assessment of the human condition, one would reach the
same moral conclusions about what our responsibilities to each other as
members of the human community are. Additionally, for at least some of the
religious traditions that come to us out of Biblical religions, the belief that
God is both creator and revealer suggests that one ought to be confident that
the moral lessons found either in divine revelation or through a rational
assessment of human needs and capacities ought to be profoundly compatible
with each other.
There are several places in Carter's thinking where he seems to get echoes of this possibility, but they are never given a full hearing. In discussing
the civil rights movement, Carter points out that Martin Luther King's "I
Have a Dream" speech was brimming over with images drawn from the
Bible and Negro Spirituals and "could have been delivered from the pulpit
without a single change."' True enough, yet it is really beside the point.
Dr. King's appeal had power because he found and articulated common
values shared by both our religious and enlightenment traditions. Dr. King
often used Biblical language to make constitutional points. "Let justice roll
down like water and righteousness like an everlasting stream" was a call to
the nation to live up to the ideals explicitly stated in the constitution. Another way of putting it might be that Dr. King's language was Biblical and his
authority was constitutional. Of course the Biblical language brought Biblical
authority with it, but this is nevertheless an example of a religious leader
"translating" religious values into the common (and secular) system of values
widely shared in his society, without ceasing to be who he was: a Baptist
minister. Carter also cites Dr. King's "Letter From a Birmingham Jail" taking
issue with unjust laws: "A just law is a man-made code that squares with the
moral law or the law of God.""5 "What moral law?" we might ask. No
doubt the same one Madison and Jefferson believed was "self evident," discernable to reason, inherent in the order of things, placed there by nature or
nature's God. Either way the same fundamental truths are imposed upon our
minds and consciences.
In discussing euthanasia, Carter argues that medical interventions which
prolong death often with enormous suffering and expense, and regularly turn
human beings into ghastly exhibits of the virtuosity of technology, are not
the most ethically informed ways of meeting death. Carter cites Pope Pius
XII on the subject: "It is unnatural to prevent death in instances where there
is no hope of recovery. When nature is calling for death, there is no question
that one can remove the life-support systems."' Here is a second instance
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in which Carter unwittingly offers an example of "translating" religiouslyheld values into a more common parlance. The Roman Catholic tradition of
natural law may well have considerable potential to serve as a model of
bridging sacred and secular value systems while respecting the integrity of
both. Note that Pius XII was able to speak of nature callingfor death, something which in Fundamentalism is difficult to do for there, all nature is fallen
and thoroughly overwhelmed by grace. Moral knowledge, in the case of
natural law, is gained not from revelation, but from a rational assessment of
the world in a rather Jeffersonian fashion. It is important to recognize that
numerous Roman Catholic moral teachings regarding contraception and abortion are drawn not from revelation, but from natural law.57
The fact that a moral position has been held and shared by several religious traditions certainly ought to get it a hearing in the public realm. However getting a hearing and being taken seriously as a live option upon which
we might base some broadly-held conclusions are two very different things.
A public discussion of what our -responsibilities to the homeless might be
should ask, early on, what our various religious traditions have to say on that
question. Similarly a sex education course ought to include representative
selections of teachings on sexual morality held by various American sects.
Positions that can appeal to more than revelation will eventually have the
advantage as the argument proceeds. No one need be ruled out at the outset,
but then, as I have argued, getting started is the easiest part of the process.
Rendering consensual judgments will be far more difficult.
Carter's major contribution to steering us through the culture wars may
well be his suggestion that we apply the First Amendment's Free Exercise
Clause more broadly than the Supreme Court has shown itself willing to do.
In Carter's view, the Employment Division v. Smith" decision fails to understand religion as a positive good in the society which government must
respect.5 9 A proper accommodation of religious beliefs and practices'
would mean not only avoiding discriminating against religion, but being
willing to honor religious claims for exemptions from particular laws and
social policies which they find contrary to what their religions require of
them. Should the reasoning of Justice Scalia prevail, free exercise could be
severely curtailed if it involved a mere inconvenience to the society at large.
Minority religions are especially vulnerable in this area. Carter cites this

57. It is also important to recognize that natural law allows some flexibility, even thorough revisions
of moral teaching, as the natural context of our life changes. For example, although the church has not yet
taken this route, it is possible, taking into consideration the dangers of overpopulation, pollution and
strains on resources, to make an argument that natural law requires rather than prohibits the use of contraception.
58. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
59. CARTER, supra note 6, at 124-35.
60. The two are not so easily separated by religious people.
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significant observation from Kathleen Sulivan, "not a single religious exemption claim has ever reached the Supreme Court from a mainstream Christian
religious practitioner."" Requiring the government to return to a standard of
"compelling interest" in order to prohibit religious action' wins Carter's
support, although he expresses both regret and concern over the necessity of
protecting free exercise legislatively instead of recognizing it as an unalienable right.6
In the inevitable conflicts between the conformity which the majority
attempts to require through state coercion and the freedom to live differently
which various minorities claim, Carter suggests a kind of balanced weighing.
In order to limit free exercise the majority must show a "compelling interest," demonstrating that to permit some religiously required actions would
pose a serious threat to the general welfare. In order to require compliance
with a social value, like not discriminating on the basis of race, the state
should also have a fairly solid social consensus behind its policy. When
religions make their cases for exemptions from social law or policy, Carter
similarly suggests that we determine which religious commitments are central
to a particular tradition and only limit or otherwise encroach upon those
which are not central.' On the face of it, it seems a fair bargain with similar requirements of each side. Yet, this is a suggestion which seems much
too close to giving magistrates the authority which Madison called an "arrogant pretension"-the discernment of religious truth.'
Carter's call to respect the autonomy of religious belief and practice is
likely to offend activists from across the political spectrum. Should states
turn to a "voucher system" in order to fund elementary and secondary education, Carter argues that to exclude religious schools when other private
schools would be included would be to discriminate against religion in ways
that the "equal access law" was intended to eliminate. But the implementation of such a plan would likely be a mixed blessing at best, for there may
be a high price attached to state support. Carter points out that the tax exemptions currently granted to religious institutions tend to require a degree of
political correctness from those receiving the favor." What Carter should
have added is that the privilege of receiving voucher funding is guaranteed to
entail curricular correctness. This may well mean the teaching of evolutionary biology in Christian schools as well as standard forms of history and
social studies. 7
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Carter has no problem with the remote possibility that someone might
claim a religious right to be exempt from anti-abortion legislation and suggests, again quite reasonably, that in making decisions on whether to allow
natural processes of dying to occur or whether to intervene with death-delaying technology, a person's religious beliefs be taken into account. If death is
the gateway to another and more glorious form of existence, then there
seems little point in the hospital unnecessarily keeping one from one's salvation. More controversial, with good reason, is Carter's belief that respect for
the freedom of groups like the Jehovah's Witnesses may require the death of
children. When a religion's system of beliefs claims that one loses salvation
as a result of having received a blood transfusion even involuntarily, the
society is put in the position of making an uncomfortable choice. The state
can treat the religious beliefs as false or of little consequence and order the
transfusion, or it can allow the free exercise of religion and not force Witnesses to receive a blood transfusion (which violates their own belief system), but at the price of allowing some children to die."
Regarding our most heated and violence-prone controversy, abortion,
Carter advises that the current status of the law is too fragile for the prochoice side (which he supports) to assume much security. Basing the right to
an abortion upon maintaining that a fetus has no claim to personhood holds
abortion rights hostage to the opinions (and politics) of the Supreme
Court.' It also, Carter implies, invites an endless religious battle over the
humanness of fetal life, and requires the pro-choice side to reject the reigious claims of its opponents not just as wrong, but as irrelevant to the debate.7" Instead, Carter suggests that those who have made the argument that
women will retain a right to an abortion even if the fetus is judged a human
person are following what, in the long run, will be a more promising and
secure line of thought. 1 What Carter omits from this discussion, however, is
that in our current context of debate, the only persuasive line of argument
anyone has is framed in the language of individual rights. Again, this is
because the primary value of American society is the freedom of the individual to transact business with a minimum of interference, and this invites us
to frame serious moral disagreements in absolutist and individualistic terms.
As Robert Bellah and Mary Ann Glendon argue, 'This formulation has led to
an all-or-nothing approach: either the fetus is a person whose right to life is

Some of the texts used in schools associated with Fundamentalist Protestant churches, for example, discuss the Civil War with barely a mention of slavery.
68. CARTER, supra note 6, at 219-21. Presumably salvation/damnation is more central to Jehovah's
Witnesses than racial segregation is to Bob Jones Baptists, and so Carter will impose societal standards on
the latter but not on the former.
69. Id. at 252.
70. Id. at 258.
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absolute... or the fetus is not a person in which case the woman's right to
an abortion is absolute... ."" Perhaps one could make an argument for
abortion rights on the basis of equal access to the competitive markets of the
culture, but that too seems to leave us with the absolutist language of individual rights."
Ironically Carter, who lamented the necessity of legislation to return to
Native Americans the right to use peyote in religious rituals and believes the
court should have found such freedom to be a right, here laments the reliance
on courts rather than what implicitly seems to be legislative approaches.
Ideally those who make the argument that legislative solutions are preferable
to judicial ones have on their side the fact that only a social consensus has
much stability. But they, too, may be fooling themselves in their assumption
that legislative action represents something resembling a consensus. With the
need for perpetual campaigning, to raise thousands, perhaps tens of thousands
of dollars a week for political advertising, current legislative actions may
have little more than current whims to back them up. In the meanwhile, the
courts' protection of rights alleviates the suffering of those who otherwise
might face interminable waits for legislative winds to blow their way.
The Culture of Disbeliefappears to harbor the hope that truth will have a
greater chance of prevailing if religious discourse is welcomed more genuinely into public debate. Possibly the broadened understanding of free exercise
Carter urges will foster a wider variety of mediating institutions and hence
enrich the perspectives we are capable of bringing to bear upon our common
world. But then again it could also contribute to the hardening of sectarian
perspectives and the perpetuation of "winner-take-all" politics. Carter seems
to be betting that simply being given a place at the table will make some of
us more amenable to the requirements of civility. He also urges political
activism against those claiming to be offering their own prejudices to the
society as God's own legislation. I read him as calling for a broader involvement of religious people as religious people in our public arenas. One problem Carter may have identified without being explicit about it is that the religious perspectives he would like to see articulated in public are either silent,
or, because their adherents are comfortable "translating" their agenda into
secular terms, are no longer identifiable as religious. More religious voices in
public debate would not only offer additional sources of insight, but also
break the current identification of "religious" with "irrational" or "extremist."
In his final chapter ominously titled "Religious Fascism," Carter urges moderate and liberal believers who find the policies of the Christian Right
wrongheaded, or un-Christian, to counter-mobilize and win their case at the
polls. Perhaps such endeavors can also make some contribution to our devel-
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oping a moral language more adequate for comprehending our common life
and for inching us along toward a realistic vision of the common good.
Without that, we are, as Hannah Arendt feared, citizens of a world that "has
lost its power to gather [us] together, to relate and separate [us]." We are left
as participants of a seance "where a number of people gather[ed] around a
table might suddenly... see the table vanish from their midst, so that persons seated opposite each other were no longer separated but also... entirely unrelated to each other by anything tangible."' 4
In this condition of confrontational unrelatedness we have a tendency to
hurl words like howitzer shells, intended not to enlighten, but eliminate. The
Culture of Disbelief raises more issues than it is ready to resolve or even
describe in all their disheartening detail, and it has a tendency to treat beginnings as if they were stations well along the way. In an ironic observation
near the end of the book, Carter accuses liberals of being "statists," when to
my observations it is the religious conservatives who are most eager to use
the power of the state to enforce their orthodoxy. But recognizing the universal human tendency to condemn in others what one wishes to deny in oneself, I am inclined to return to a re-reading of Niebuhr motivated by Carter's
final warning which bears the imprint of America's greatest religious thinker:
"The closer religions move to the center of secular power.., the less likely
they are to discover meanings that are in competition with those imposed by
the state." ' We are blessed with a political system which is required to
cherish enemies of the state as prophetic witnesses with whom we muddle
our way through. Perhaps that in itself is grounds for some optimism. I give
the penultimate word to William Lee Miller's exposition of Jefferson:
It is ... important to hold to that "truth" can prevail by "free
argument and debate," in an age when many see only
'preferences' and therefrom manipulation. These Jeffersonian
truths stand about as near as anything to the moral core of the
nation he helped bring into being. They are anchors of the American mind and moral understanding, not weapons with which to
dominate.... In the great contests of humankind it is not that
"we" will prevail, but that Truth will prevail, and Truth will prevail from its greatness, not ours, by free, and only by free, argument and debate, which presumably continues forever.76
For those who are tempted to proclaim a culture war and press for total
victory, thus relieving us of the burden of endless debate, a final warning
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from Justice Jackson: "Compulsory unification of opinion achieves only the
unanimity of the graveyard.""
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